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THE CYCLICALITY OF MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY IN SOUTH 
AFRICA SINCE 1994 










This paper uses an SVAR approach to discuss the cyclicality of fiscal and monetary policy in 
South Africa since 1994. There is substantial South African literature on this topic, but much 
disagreement  remains.  Though  not  undisputed,  there  is  growing  consensus  that  monetary 
policy has contributed to the remarkable stabilisation of the South African economy over this 
period. The evaluation of the role of fiscal policy in stabilisation has been less favourable and 
there is little evidence that a countercyclical fiscal stance was a priority over this period. This 
paper  considers  these  issues  in  an  empirical  framework  that  addresses  some  of  the 
shortcomings in the literature. Specifically, it constructs a structural model in contrast with the 
reduced form models typically used in the South African literature, incorporates the dynamic 
interaction between monetary and fiscal shocks on the demand side and supply shocks on the 
other, and avoids controversy over ‘neutral’ base years and the size of fiscal elasticities. The 
model  confirms  the  consensus  on  monetary  policy,  finding  it  to  have  been  largely 
countercyclical  since  1994.  On  fiscal  policy,  this  paper  finds  evidence  of  pro-cyclicality, 
especially  in  the  more  recent  period,  though  the  policy  simulations  suggest  that  the  pro-
cyclicality of fiscal policy has had little destabilising impact on real output. 
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THE CYCLICALITY OF MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY IN SOUTH 
AFRICA SINCE 1994 
 
“The stakes in choosing the right monetary and fiscal policies are high” Robert Lucas (2003: 3) argued in his 
presidential  address  to  the  American  Economic  Association.  Mistakes  at  this  level  cause  inflation,  distort 
decisions in labour and capital markets, and might either precipitate or fail to prevent recessions. Lucas proceeded 
to calculate the potential welfare gain of improving fiscal and monetary policies to attain an ‘optimal’ stabilisation 
policy and found that the potential welfare gains from such improvements were orders of magnitude smaller than 
the potential gains from supply-side policy reforms. Whether this result and the associated policy priorities also 
hold  for  South  Africa  is  an  empirical  question,  and  this  paper  contributes  towards  an  answer  thereto  by 
estimating (i) the extent to which monetary and fiscal policies have been pro- or anti-cyclical since 1994 and (ii) 
the effect of these cyclical characteristics on output volatility in South Africa.  
 
This paper examines the cyclicality of monetary and fiscal policies in an empirical framework that distinguishes 
between transitory ‘aggregate demand’ and permanent ‘aggregate supply’ shocks, building on the earlier work of 
Shapiro and Watson (1988), Blanchard and Quah (1989), and Clarida and Gali (1994). Using additional identifying 
restrictions allows us to disaggregate the demand shock into separate fiscal and monetary policy shocks. These 
results are described briefly in the second section of the paper, following an introductory section on the relevant 
literature in South Africa. The third section of the paper uses the identified monetary and fiscal polices to answer 
the questions about the cyclicality of policy posed above. A counterfactual policy simulation is used to judge the 
potential gains from more consistent counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies in South Africa. 
 
1.  LITERATURE  
Over the last ten years the South African economy has experienced a remarkable period of economic stability 
coupled,  since  1999,  with  the  longest  business  cycle  expansion  in  the  country’s  history.  Indeed  a  ‘great 
moderation’ – as the improvement in economic stability has been called in the literature on developed economies 
(for example, Blanchard and Simon, 2001; Stock and Watson, 2003) – has come about in South Africa. The 
important dimensions of the South African moderation include lower and stable inflation, lower and stable real 
interest rates, positive and steady GDP growth, and stable  fiscal deficits, and debt (for  example, Aron  and 
Muellbauer, 2005: 134-138).   
  4 
 
Figure 1 summarises this ‘great moderation’ in the form of a standard loss function2 for South Africa since the 
mid-sixties. It shows a loss function, combining the variability of inflation and real output for three different 
assumptions of the relative importance of output and inflation variability3. Figure 1 shows that the economy was 
considerably  more  stable  during  the  first  and  last  decades  under  consideration,  regardless  of  the  relative 
importance  given  to  output  and  inflation variability.  In  other  words,  the  judgement  that  the  South  African 
economy has experienced a ‘great moderation’ does not depend on the reader’s viewpoint with respect to the 
relative importance of output and inflation stability.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
It is not just relative to its own history that the South African economy has experienced remarkable stabilisation, 
but also relative to the experience of other emerging market economies. Figure 2 shows a cross plot (over the 
period 1996 to 2006) of inflation variability (on the x-axis) against output variability (on the y-axis) for the 
countries of the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Markets Index4. Evidently, the South 
African economy has benefited from an exceptionally benign environment (in terms of output and inflation 
stability) compared to most of its peers in the emerging market group.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Many  factors  are  associated  with  ‘great  moderations’.  While  the  international  environment  has  been  less 
disruptive in recent years, in the earlier part of this period it subjected the economy to considerable external 
shocks in the wake of the Mexican, Asian, Russian-Brazilian and Argentinean capital market crises.  However, 
during this period the South African economy has become progressively more open to international capital flows 
                                                       
2 A loss function combines various dimensions of a problem into a single figure. In this case, output and inflation variability are combined 
to form a single ‘loss’ for society at every date.  
3 The loss function was constructed by calculating, for each of the 4 decades shown (1965-1974, 1975-1984, 1985-1994, 1995-2004), the 
ratio of the variance to the mean of real GDP growth and year-to-year consumer price inflation. The three loss functions have different 
weights, with the low inflation aversion using a weight of 0.25 for inflation variability, the medium inflation aversion function having equal 
weights for inflation and real output growth variability and the high inflation aversion function implying the use of a weight of 0.75 for 
inflation variability.  
4 Figure 2 is a cross plot with the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of annual consumer price inflation on the x-axis and the ratio 
of the standard deviation to the mean of annual real GDP growth on the y-axis, the standard deviations and means having been calculated 
with quarterly IFS data from Q11996 until Q2006.    
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and trade5. Trade openness leads to lower volatility through a number of channels. Firstly, openness reduces the 
effectiveness of monetary policy as the prices of more goods become linked to the exchange rate, thus reducing 
the incentives to pursue inflationary policies (see Rogoff, 1985; Romer, D.H., 1993). Secondly, it allows for a 
quicker recovery from external shocks (Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía, 2003; Guidotti, Sturzenegger and Villar, 
2004). Finally, Cavallo and Frankel (2004) provide evidence that the possibility of a ‘sudden stop’ is smaller for 
countries which are more open to trade.  
 
Another factor associated with the ‘great moderation’ is the successful political transition during the early nineties, 
culminating in the first election under universal franchise in April 1994, which has been associated with a marked 
drop in systemic uncertainty due to social and political factors. Fedderke, de Kadt and Luiz (2001) provide 
empirical evidence of the decline in political instability since the early nineties. Du Plessis, Smit and Sturzenegger 
(2007) show how potential output had declined precipitously relative to trend in the two decades prior to 1994, a 
process  associated  with  the  internal  and  external  opposition  to  the  system  of  Apartheid  and  considerable 
instability connected to the upcoming change in political regime. The process of decline not only stabilised but 
reverted after 1994.  
 
Aron and Muellbauer (2005) list further systemic risk factors that have declined since 1994, including the closure 
of the net open forward position at the South African Reserve Bank, and moves toward a more systematic fiscal 
and monetary policy.  It is this claim – that monetary and fiscal policies have contributed to a less volatile 
economic environment in South Africa since 1994 – that is at stake in this paper. The remainder of this section 
summarises the literature on the cyclicality of fiscal and monetary policies in South Africa over this period.  
 
1.1  Fiscal policy 
 
Though the history of fiscal policy in South Africa since 19946 is one of extraordinary success on important 
dimensions – such as stabilising the debt to GDP ratio, lowering the interest burden, achieving a considerable 
                                                       
5 The extent to which the South African economy has effectively opened up to international trade and competition is a matter of some 
controversy. Fedderke and Vaze (2001) have argued that despite the decline in average barriers since the early nineties, the effective 
protection of large domestic sectors, such as the financial sector and mining,  have risen over the same period. More recently Edwards and 
Lawrence (2006) disputed Fedderke and Vaze (2001) with empirical evidence of effective liberalisation at the aggregate and sectoral level in 
South Africa since the late 1980s. This is consistent with Arora and Bhundia’s (2003) earlier interpretation of the sharp rise in South 
Africa’s trade ratio over this period.  
6 Calitz and Siebrits (2003) and Ajam and Aron (2007) are useful accounts of this history.    
  6 
transfer  of  resources  from  richer  to  poorer  households,  and  adopting  a  multi-year  and  forward-looking 
framework for budget planning – some of its dimensions were controversial. Part of this controversy – Weeks 
(1999) is a good example – is about the role of fiscal policy in stimulating growth, with critics arguing for a more 
expansionary fiscal stance to boost the long-run growth rate of the economy. There is also controversy about the 
cyclicality of fiscal policy, or the claim that fiscal policy has become pro-cyclical in South Africa, as in many other 
developing countries (Frankel, Smit and Sturzenegger, 2007: 61). 
 
It is true that there is little evidence of fiscal policy being used intentionally as a counter-cyclical policy tool since 
19947. Only three times since 1996 has the Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, explicitly mentioned that the 
planned  fiscal  stance  was  adjusted  for  the  economic  cycle,  though  the  minister  has  often  referred  to  the 
‘expansionary’ stance of fiscal policy since 2002. The explicit references are the Medium Term Budget Policy 
Statement of October 1998 (Manuel, 1998) and the Budget Speech of February 2001 (Manuel, 2001), both of 
which referred to intentional expansionary fiscal stances, and the reference to a more contractionary stance, in his 
2007 budget (Manuel, 2007: 10), as an appropriate part of creating ‘a check on emerging imbalances in the 
economy. 
 
Despite the intentions of fiscal authorities, automatic stabilisers could generate counter-cyclical policy, which 
means that the actual cyclicality of fiscal policy is an empirical question to be resolved using various measures. 
The recent South African literature on the topic has seen the use of four different empirical measures, viz.: (i) 
using a structural budget balance (Swanepoel and Schoeman, 2003), (ii) the calculation of cyclically adjusted fiscal 
impulse (Horton, 2005; Ajam and Aron, 2007; Swanepoel, 2007), (iii) an analysis of government expenditure (Du 
Plessis, 2004), and (iv) using a structural vector-autoregression (SVAR) to identify the fiscal policy (Frankel et al., 
2007).  
 
Structural budget balance 
There are different definitions of a ‘structural’ budget balance. In the South African literature Swanepoel and 
Schoeman  (2003)  and  Swanepoel  (2004)  calculate  the  structural  primary  budget  balance  after  adjusting  the 
components of government revenue and expenditure for the output gap. This adjustment requires an estimate of 
                                                       
7  Calitz  and  Siebrits  (2003:  56)  argued  that  the  fiscal  authorities  in  South  Africa  had  not  entertained  Keynesian  policies  of  active 
discretionary countercyclical policies since the late seventies.   
  7 
the output elasticities of the various components of government expenditure and revenue (though in South 
Africa only the revenue side of the budget has numerically relevant automatic stabilisers). A comparison of the 
resulting structural budget balance with the unfolding economic cycle indicates the extent to which discretionary 
fiscal policy has been pro- and counter-cyclical. Swanepoel and Schoeman (2003) and Swanepoel (2004) recently 
used this technique to judge the cyclicality of fiscal policy in South Africa since the seventies. For the post-1994 
period their conclusion was that fiscal policy has often been pro-cyclical since the early nineties, partly due to the 
weak automatic stabilisers implied by their calculations. 
 
Du Plessis and Boshoff (2007) offer a more recent calculation of the structural budget balance, in the same 
tradition, but differ from the Swanepoel studies in three ways: (i) by substituting quarterly data for the annual data 
used by Swanepoel, (ii) by re-estimating the output elasticities of various components of government revenue, 
and  (iii)  by  substituting  the  alternative  measure  of  the  business  cycle  proposed  by  Du  Plessis,  Smit  and 
Sturzenegger (2007) for the Hodrick-Prescott-based measure used by Swanepoel.  
 
The results of Du Plessis and Boshoff (2007) differ in important respects from the earlier results by Swanepoel 
and Schoeman (2003) and Swanepoel (2004). Firstly, the output elasticities of government revenue as estimated 
by Du Plessis and Boshoff (2007) are more than twice as high as the estimates by Swanepoel and Schoeman 
(2003) and closer to similar estimates for developed countries. This comparison of the output elasticities of 
government revenue is repeated in table 1 below which shows the estimates of Du Plessis and Boshoff (2007), 
those of Swanepoel and Schoeman (2003) and comparable estimates for the OECD (Girouard and André, 2005).  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The actual and structural budgets for South Africa as estimated by Du Plessis and Boshoff (2007) are shown in 
Figure 3. During the downswing from 1989 to 1993 and the subsequent upswing, the structural budget balance 
moved counter-cyclically. This was followed by a pro-cyclical decline of the structural budget balance during the 
downswing of 1997 to 1999 and an ambiguous trend during the present expansion. This evidence does not 
support any strong opinion about the cyclicality of discretionary fiscal policy over this period, and this result is 
the second notable contrast between Du Plessis and Boshoff (2007) and Swanepoel and Schoeman (2003). 
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Figure 3 about here 
 
Thirdly, while Swanepoel’s (2004) results suggest that automatic stabilisers have been eroded in South Africa, Du 
Plessis and Boshoff (2007) show the opposite, i.e. that automatic stabilisers operated as expected during the 
downswing of 1997/99 as well as during the present expansion. This claim is supported by Figure 3 which shows 
a widening gap between the actual and structural budget balance during the 1997 to 1998 downswing and a 
closing of that gap as actual output catches up with potential output during the present expansion.  
 
An alternative computation is undertaken by Ortiz, Talvi and Sturzenegger (2007). They provide a simple exercise 
which is to replicate the Chilean structural fiscal rule. The Chileans aim for a structural surplus of 1% of GDP 
(recently reduced to 0.5%), where the structural surplus is defined by using permanent, i.e. cyclically adjusted 
revenues. To estimate these ‘usable’ revenues Ortiz et al. (2007) first compute the Lagrange multiplier of the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter for current revenues in Chile, which aims at assessing how much the Chilean authorities 
smooth  their  income.  The  Lagrange  multiplier  that  delivers  a  surplus/deficit  matching  the  structural  deficit 
reported by the authorities is the one that provides a statistical equivalent to their complex rules for determining 
sustainable income.8 They then apply this filter to revenues from other countries to compute their ‘structural 
balances’. The results for South Africa are presented in Figure 4, which shows how South African authorities 
reduced  the  structural  balance  during  the  1990s.  In  recent  years,  however,  while  the  observed  deficit  has 
decreased and finally turned into a surplus, the structural deficit has increased quite dramatically, signalling that 
the current surplus is the result of what could be considered extraordinary revenues.   
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
The fiscal impulse 
An alternative method for distinguishing between the automatic and discretionary components of fiscal policy is 
the calculation of a fiscal impulse, where this is defined as the change in the stance of fiscal policy due to 
discretionary decisions on taxation and expenditure (Chand, 1977; Schinasi and Lutz, 1991). This method also 
requires adjustments to government revenue and expenditure due to the effects of the economic cycle (and 
                                                       
8 The Chilean rule is determined, in part, by a committee of experts that suggests which portion of the resources should be 
considered sustainable and which should not, particularly those arising from royalties on copper production. Obviously, this 
rule is not replicable for other countries, thus the methodology for finding a ‘statistical equivalent’ to it.   
  9 
sometimes inflation), to identify the fiscal impulse. It has been attempted in three recent papers in the South 
African literature, namely, Horton (2005), Ajam and Aron  (2007), and Swanepoel (2007).  
 
The papers by Horton (2005) and Ajam and Aron  (2007) pursue the same version of the fiscal impulse and their 
method is as follows: Firstly, they define government revenue and expenditure in a base period as ‘neutral’, with 
Horton selecting the fiscal year 1998/99, and Ajam and Aron selecting the fiscal year 2000/01 for this purpose9. 
Secondly, both sets of authors assume that neutral non-interest government expenditure evolves with potential 
GDP10, while neutral government revenue evolves with actual GDP. Thirdly, given these assumptions, a neutral 
primary balance can be calculated for each period, and the fiscal stance is defined as the difference between this 
neutral primary balance and actual primary balance in every period11. The fiscal impulse, in turn, is defined as the 
change in the fiscal stance between successive years. Using this technique Horton (2005) and Ajam and Aron  
(2007) find evidence of pro-cyclical fiscal policy, especially in the first few years following the elections in 1994 
and during the present expansion.  
 
As an alternative to calculating the fiscal stance and fiscal impulse relative to a base period as described above, 
Swanepoel (2007) calculated the fiscal impulse using a technique derived from Blanchard (1990). Accordingly, 
government revenue  is adjusted  for changes  to the  unemployment rate  over time,  and  the fiscal impulse is 
defined  as  the  difference  between  unemployment  adjusted  budget  balances  for  successive  years.  Swanepoel 
(2007) finds that the Blanchard fiscal impulse is closely related to the changes in the structural budget balance as 
reported in Swanepoel (2004), and hence confirms his claim that fiscal policy has been mainly pro-cyclical since 
1994.  
 
But these results have been challenged by Du Plessis and Boshoff (2007) who argued that (i) Horton (2005) and 
Ajam and Aron  (2007) chose inappropriate base periods, as the South African economy was not operating close 
to potential during the downswing of 1998/99 or during the modest initial phase of the present expansion in 
2000/01, and (ii) the use of the Hodrick-Prescott filter on annual data provides a poor description of the South 
African  business  cycle  over  this  period.  Du  Plessis  and  Boshoff  (2007)  used  the  alternative  business  cycle 
                                                       
9 The economy is supposed to be operating at or near potential GDP in the base year.  
10 Identified by applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter to real GDP in both papers.  
11 A positive fiscal stance, so defined, is accommodating, while a negative fiscal stance is contractionary.   
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measure12 proposed in Du Plessis et al. (2007) to define 2005Q2 as the neutral base period when actual output 
was close to potential output. The same business cycle measure was used to calculate the fiscal stance and fiscal 
impulse.  
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
The alternative base year and alternative cycle led Du Plessis and Boshoff (2007) to a different conclusion on the 
cyclicality of fiscal policy since the early nineties; the preponderance of points in the top-left quadrant of Figure 5 
suggests that the stance of fiscal policy has often been counter-cyclical in South Africa over this period. This is 
true of two-thirds of the quarters between 1992Q1 and 2006Q3.  
 
However, two observations lead one to interpret the evidence of counter-cyclical fiscal policy cautiously. Firstly, 
the fiscal stance deteriorated sharply between 1997 and 1999, which was also the period when the output gap 
reached its largest negative value13. Indeed, if the fiscal impulse (the change in the fiscal stance) is substituted for 
the fiscal stance in Figure 3 above, then the evidence of counter-cyclical fiscal policy largely disappears. Secondly, 
if fiscal policy operated successfully as a counter-cyclical tool, we would see a pattern matching large output gaps 
with a large fiscal stance. However, there is no sign of such a pattern, suggesting that, even when counter-cyclical, 
the contribution of fiscal policy to output stabilisation must have been modest. 
 
The cyclicality of government expenditure 
Du Plessis (2004) followed Fatás and Mihov (2003: 1422) in using the ratio of government expenditure (without 
transfer payments) to GDP as a proxy for discretionary fiscal policy. But where Fatás and Mihov (2003) used a 
regression model to identify the cyclicality of this measure of fiscal policy, Du Plessis (2004) used a business cycle 
dating  algorithm  to  identify  periods  of  relatively  expansionary  and  relatively  contractionary  fiscal  policy  to 
compare the phases of the South African business cycle.  
 
While  the  ratio  of  government  expenditure  (without  transfer  payments)  declined  during  the  downswing  of 
1998/99, yielding a pro-cyclical fiscal policy, it has continued to decline modestly during the present expansion, 
                                                       
12 This measure of the business cycle is identified using a structural VAR with long-run restriction in the tradition of 
Blanchard and Quah (1989).  
13 Horton (2005) also observed this counter-cyclical fiscal contraction over the same period.   
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yielding a modest counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Though the expansion of government expenditure has so far been 
prevented from turning pro-cyclical, the considerable increase of transfer payments during the present expansion 
more than outweighs the small counter-cyclical reduction of government expenditure (Du Plessis and Boshoff, 
2007).  
 
In  summary,  while  various  authors  have  identified pro-cyclical  fiscal  policy  in  South Africa  since  1994,  the 
preceding paragraphs have shown that these results are often open to challenge. This ambiguity provides an 
important rationale for the SVAR investigation proposed here.   
 
1.2   Monetary policy 
Since 1994 monetary policy in South Africa has also seen far reaching changes14. Since the late 1980s the nominal 
anchor has evolved from guidelines for growth in monetary aggregates, to ‘informal’ inflation targeting in the late 
1990s  and  finally  comprehensive  inflation  targeting  since  February  2000.  While  the  successes,  in  terms  of 
credibility for the monetary authorities have been considerable (Aron and Muellbauer, 2006), Frankel et al. (2007: 
59)  highlighted  the  risk  that  supply  shocks  pose  to  a  narrowly  defined  inflation  targeting  regime.  A  ‘strict’ 
inflation targeting central bank could, for example, tighten monetary policy in response to an adverse supply 
shock,  yielding  pro-cyclical  monetary  policy.  The  extent  to  which  the  South  African  Reserve  Bank  (SARB) 
avoided the risk is an empirical question and a few local authors have investigated various aspects of the question 
in recent years.  
 
Monetary policy and the phases of the business cycle 
In a recent paper Du Plessis and Smit (2007) used a method proposed by Christina and David Romer (1994) to 
measure the cyclicality of monetary policy following turning points in the business cycle. While Romer and 
Romer (1994) found clear evidence that real (and nominal) interest rates declined (rose) cumulatively in the eight 
quarters following a peak (trough) in economic activity in the USA during the post-War era, Du Plessis and Smit 
(2007) did not find similar evidence for South Africa since the early 1980s. Indeed, the cumulative change in the 
real and nominal interest rates was usually perverse. However, a major shortcoming of this methodology is that it 
neglects the long and variable lags in the monetary policy transmission mechanism.  
 
                                                       
14 Aron and Muellbauer (2006) provide an thorough summary of these developments.   
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In a similar spirit, Swanepoel (2004) compared changes in the real short-term interest with the contemporaneous 
output gap. On this evidence the stance of monetary policy was often pro-cyclical from 1993/4 to 2002/3.  
However, the same concerns with regards to the lags of the transmission mechanism could be raised here.  
 
Lags in monetary policy transmission and the business cycle 
Du Plessis (2006) attempts to make explicit allowance for the lags in monetary policy transmission when judging 
the cyclicality of monetary policy. He uses a business cycle dating technique to identify periods of relatively 
expansionary and contractionary monetary policy and compares these ‘phases’ of the monetary policy cycle with 
the  South  African  business  cycle.  This  comparison,  taking  into  account  a  four  to  six  quarter  lag  for  the 
transmission mechanism, yields a striking result; prior to 1990 there was essentially no relationship between the 
business cycle and the monetary policy cycle, but after 1990 a clear forward-looking counter-cyclical relationship 
emerges.  
 
To summarise, there is evidence of pro-cyclical monetary policy in South Africa since the early nineties. However, 
much of the evidence ignores lags in the monetary policy transmission mechanism.   
 
2.  IDENTIFYING FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS: AN SVAR ANALYSIS 
 
The literature summarised in the previous section does not give a clear message on the cyclicality of monetary and 
fiscal policy in South Africa. Many of the results were heavily dependent on contestable assumptions about base 
years, elasticities, measures of the business cycle, a narrow view of the dynamics of macroeconomic relationships, 
and a single-variable approach to multi-variable problems. They are attempts at model-free policy analysis lacking 
benchmarks against which to judge the observed policies. This section proposes an empirical framework that 
addresses some of these shortcomings. Specifically, it constructs a structural model in contrast with the typically 
reduced form used in the South African literature, provides a multivariate approach that incorporates the dynamic 
interaction between monetary and fiscal shocks on the demand side and supply shocks on the other, and avoids 
assumptions about ‘neutral’ base years and the size of elasticities.   
 
The model proposed here is a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) with long-run identifying restrictions in 
the tradition of Blanchard and Quah (1989). While they used long-run restrictions in a bivariate model to identify  
  13
aggregate supply and demand shocks, we followed the literature of Galí (1992) and Clarida and Galí (1994) who 
further disaggregate demand shock. Specifically, we used the three-variable model described in Du Plessis et al. 
(2007), which uses the information contained in the output, government consumption to GDP, and the real 
interest rate series, to identify aggregate supply and demand shocks and to subdivide the aggregate demand 
shocks into identified monetary and fiscal policy shocks. 
 
A number of identifying restrictions are required to map the reduced form VAR estimated with time series data 
to the structural VAR which is posited as the data-generating mechanism. These identifying restrictions yield a 
time series of structural shocks for each of the three variables in the model and for the estimated parameters of 
the dynamic interactions. The estimated parameters describe how the three structural shocks cumulatively and 
jointly generate the three variables. 
 
The identification problem in this model requires three additional restrictions, which in the SVAR tradition are 
specified from theoretical priors. Blanchard and Quah (1989) suggested that long-run neutrality conditions could 
be  used  to  solve  the  identification  problem  and  their  solution  is  adopted  here  too.  The  first  two  of  these 
neutrality  conditions  separate  the  aggregate  supply  shock  from  the  two  aggregate  demand  shocks,  i.e.  the 
restrictions that the fiscal and  monetary policy  shocks  have  no long-run  impact  on  real  output.   The third 
theoretical restriction states that there are no long-run effects on fiscal policy of the stance on monetary policy. 
This restriction means that the real interest rate (the proxy for monetary policy) does not have a long-run effects 
on the ratio of government expenditure to GDP (the proxy for fiscal policy), a condition which requires the 
assumption that the preferences for public goods are independent of the interest cost.  
 
The model was estimated with seasonally adjusted quarterly time series data starting in the second quarter of 1960 
and ending in the fourth quarter of 2006. Table 2 shows the variables used in the model. The reduced form VAR 
was estimated with a lag length of four. To check robustness, the estimation and identification were implemented 
on the entire sample, starting in the second quarter of 1960 and on a sub-sample, starting in the fourth quarter of 
1983. 
 
Table 2 about here 
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Du Plessis et al. (2007) reported three types of evidence supporting this model: impulse response functions and 
variance decomposition that were consistent with theoretical priors, and a historical decomposition of aggregate 
supply and demand shocks that was consistent with independent information about shocks to potential output 
and to the business cycle.  
 
The historical decomposition referred to above is a technique that uses the dynamic interactions and the series of 
structural shocks to create three different in-sample forecasts for real GDP, dependant on the model and on 
inputting each structural shock separately. In this manner the model delivers a profile for output when only 
supply shocks are present, when only monetary shocks are present, or when only fiscal shocks are present. The 
first in-sample forecast shows how real GDP would have evolved, if this model had been used with only the 
identified aggregate supply shocks as disturbances (the monetary and fiscal policy shocks having been set to zero). 
The second in-sample forecast sets the identified aggregate supply and fiscal shocks to zero and uses the model to 
trace the predicted in-sample evolution of real GDP if the monetary policy shocks were the only identified 
disturbances  to  the  system.  The  third  in-sample  forecast  based  on  the  identified  fiscal  policy  shocks  was 
constructed analogously.  
 
3.  MODEL-BASED EVIDENCE ON THE CYCLICALITY OF MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY 
The SVAR model used here provides three types of evidence on the cyclicality of fiscal and monetary policy. 
Firstly, impulse response functions show the dynamic responses of the three variables to identified aggregate 
supply and demand shocks. Secondly, the historical decomposition reveals the time pattern of the monetary and 
fiscal policy shocks, which could be compared with the historical pattern of supply shocks and with real GDP. 
Finally, the model could be used to simulate the outcome of alternatives to the observed policy shocks to create a 
counterfactual with which to compare the observed history. This section explores the evidence from the impulse 
response functions and the historical decomposition, while the counterfactual analysis is reported in section four.  
 
3.1 Innovation accounting  
 
Figures 6 and 7 show the impulse response functions for government consumptions (Figure 6) and the real 
interest rate (Figure 7) to the three identified shocks, given the model. Impulse response functions are reported 




Figure 6 about here 
 
The impulse response graphs in the first row of figure 6 shows that the government consumption to GDP 
declines in response to a positive supply shock, though this effect disappears over time (more rapidly in the case 
of the shorter sample). This is a counter-cyclical fiscal response to supply shocks, as it implies that government 
expenditures lag output expansion temporarily, in response to a positive aggregate supply shock. 
 
While the first row of Figure 6 shows a counter-cyclical fiscal response to supply shocks, the second row shows a 
mildly pro-cyclical response by government expenditure to a monetary policy shock. A positive shock to the real 
interest rate (a contractionary demand shock) leads to a mild and short-lived rise in the ratio of government to 
real GDP, i.e. fiscal policy somewhat counteracts the impact of a monetary policy shock on real GDP. However, 
the counteractive fiscal effect does not remove the intuitive contractionary effect of the monetary policy shock on 
real GDP, as is shown in Figure 7. Real GDP declines temporarily in response to a contractionary monetary 
policy shock.  
 
Figure 7 about here 
 
Turning to monetary policy, the first row of Figure 8 shows a temporary rise for the real interest rate in response 
to a positive aggregate supply shock. This is evidence of a counter-cyclical response by monetary policy in the 
face of supply shocks, and is important given the concern that monetary policy might respond pro-cyclically 
under an inflation targeting regime. However, the impulse response functions show the average effect over the 
entire sample and are not limited to the inflation targeting period since early 2000.  
 
The second row of Figure 8 shows a temporary decline for the real interest rate in response to an expansionary 
fiscal policy shock. Such a monetary policy response would amplify the positive impact of expansionary fiscal 
policy shock.  
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Figure 8 about here 
 
3.2 Historical decomposition  
A historical decomposition allows us to assign portions of the historical variation in real GDP to the three 
identified shocks. The shares of the variation in real GDP attributable to the two policy shocks and their time 
pattern are of specific interest.  
 
Figure 9 shows the response of real GDP to fiscal policy shocks for the models estimated over the longer and 
shorter  samples,  against  a  background  showing  business  cycle  expansions  as  shaded  areas15.  There  is  little 
evidence of counter-cyclical impact on real GDP for fiscal policy over the sample period. For example, since 
1994 fiscal policy moved counter-cyclically during the expansion of 1993 to 1996 but pro-cyclically during the 
subsequent contraction of 1998 to 1999 and also pro-cyclically during the present expansion.   
 
Figure 9 about here 
 
Figure 10 shows the response of real GDP to monetary policy shocks for the models estimated over the longer 
and shorter samples, against a background showing business cycle expansions as shaded areas. The scales are 
identical in Figures 9 and 10 for ease of comparison.  
 
Figure 10 about here 
 
Figure 10 shows that since the early nineties, monetary policy has often had an impact on real GDP, which has 
been contractionary during downswings and expansionary during upswings. The downswing of 1998 to 1999 is a 
case in point, as well as the initial and final phases of the current expansion.  
 
However,  looking at the cyclicality of these  policies by  comparing  the contribution of each shock with  the 
evolution of GDP, is not entirely conclusive, because to the extent that a monetary and fiscal policy tightening 
leads to a temporary decline in aggregate demand, we expect precisely a temporary decline in real GDP which 
would be correlated with the business cycle. It follows that GDP fluctuations due to aggregate demand shocks, 
                                                       
15 The phases of the business cycle follow the official turning points for the South African business cycle published by the SARB.   
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which are bunched at the business cycle frequencies, will necessarily be correlated with a combination of the 
identified fiscal and monetary policy shocks.  
 
In order to explore this issue further, we would need to contrast the fiscal and monetary impulses vis-à-vis the 
other shocks (not the evolution of GDP that is influenced by its own effect), and in particular vis-à-vis supply 
shocks. Fiscal and monetary policy shocks that exacerbate supply shocks would raise the concern that policy 
aggravates economic fluctuations. To examine this possibility the following table shows the correlation between 
the aggregate demand shocks and the supply shocks. Correlations are reported for various samples starting in 
1984Q4, reflecting the period of modern market-based monetary policy in South Africa.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Over the sample from 1984 to 2006 the cumulative effects on GDP of both fiscal and monetary policy shocks are 
positively  correlated  with the  cumulative effects  of  the  supply shock. Where  fiscal policy is concerned,  this 
correlation is very small in the longer sample model. For both models the correlations are larger in the sub-
sample from 1994 to 2006. If we split the period since 1994 into two further sub-samples, 1994Q1 to 2002Q1 
and 2002Q1 to 2006Q4, another interesting result emerges, i.e. the positive correlation between the output effect 
of fiscal policy and the cumulative supply shock is almost entirely due to the post-2002 sub-sample. This result 
holds for both the shorter and longer sample models.  
 
The cumulative effect of the monetary policy shock is positively correlated with the cumulative output effect of 
the supply shock from 1984 to 2006, but this pro-cyclicality of monetary policy is mainly a feature of the sub-
sample 1984 to 1994, for both of the models reported in Table 3. Since 1994 both models show a negative (i.e. 
counter-cyclical) correlation. This result is consistent with the evidence of Du Plessis (2006: 772) showing largely 
pro-cyclical  monetary  policy  from  the  late  1970s  until  the  late  1980s,  followed  by  largely  counter-cyclical 
monetary policy since the early 1990s. 
 
The models estimated over the longer and shorter samples yield different patterns of correlation since 1994. Both 
models find a  large positive  pro-cyclical correlation  between the cumulative  monetary  policy  shock  and  the 
cumulative supply shock for the 2004Q4 to 2006Q4 sub-sample. However, the  two models  differ over the  
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1994Q1  to  2002Q4  correlation,  with  the  longer  sample  model  yielding  a  counter-cyclical  correlation  up  to 
2002Q1 and an acyclical pattern between 2002Q1 and 2004Q4. In contrast, the shorter sample model yielded a 
pro-cyclical correlation up to 2002Q1 and a counter-cyclical correlation between 2002Q1 and 2004Q4. These 
correlations suggest that monetary policy has mainly acted counter-cyclically over the post-1994 period, despite 
pro-cyclical monetary policy shocks since 2004.  
 
4.  ALTERNATIVE POLICY RULES AND THE CYCLICALITY OF MONETARY AND FISCAL 
POLICIES 
 
The results reported above suggest directions of influence for the potentially stabilising role of monetary and 
fiscal polices in South Africa but do not yet quantify the magnitude of these effects in comparison with a relevant 
alternative.  However, a model-based study such as this one, lends itself to asking counterfactual questions. 
Indeed, Fackler and McMillan (1998) show how to use an SVAR to generate a counterfactual for a well defined 
policy alternative.  
 
One alternative is to assume no further innovations to fiscal and monetary rules since 1994 and set the identified 
shocks to these policies to zero. This means that these policies would have followed their inertial evolution. 
Would this deliver  a  more stable output profile? We  examined these  counterfactuals  by first calculating  the 
standard deviation of real output predicted by the SVAR model over the sample 1994Q1 to 2006Q4 with the 
three structural shocks. This is called the ‘baseline’ scenario in Table 4. The baseline is compared with two 
alternatives.  In  the  first  alternative,  the  identified  monetary  policy  shocks  are  eliminated  to  show  whether 
eliminating the observed monetary policy would have stabilised real output in an economy represented by this 
model. The second alternative repeats this exercise by eliminating the identified fiscal policy shocks over the same 
period. Both alternatives are calculated with the models estimated over the shorter (starting in 1983) and longer 
(starting in 1960) samples. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
By focusing on the standard deviation of the rate of growth of GDP, the model shows that the identified fiscal 
shocks had a small destabilising impact on real output in this model, notably for the post-1994 sample. The result  
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holds for all samples and estimations and confirms our result that pro-cyclical fiscal policy appears to have added 
to output instability. The magnitude of the effect is modest though. Notice that the exercise is to shut off the 
fiscal shocks since 1994, but this does not preclude fiscal policy responses to supply and monetary policy shocks. 
As a result, the path for fiscal policy is only slightly more stable than the original (the standard deviation of the 
changes drops for the period 1994 through 2006 from 0.49 to 0.42 in the short sample, and from 0.45 to 0.38 in 
the longer sample).   
 
In contrast with the evidence of mildly pro-cyclical fiscal policy shocks, the counterfactual analysis suggests that 
the identified monetary policy shocks had either lowered the variability of real output over the entire sample (as 
estimated by the longer period model) or had a neutral impact (as estimated by the shorter period model). This 
result confirms an earlier counterfactual exercise by Du Plessis and Smit (2003) who used a method developed by 
Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause (2001) to identify the contribution of a more systematic monetary policy to 
the improved stability of the South African economy post-1994 (with a sample extending to 2002Q4). They 
found that 55% of the improved stability in terms of output and inflation variability, could be attributed to a 
more systematic monetary policy over this period, an estimate which compared favourably with the experience of 
the developed countries studied by Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause (2001). 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The South African economy has experienced a period of remarkable stabilisation since the early 1990s and this 
observed stabilisation provides the context for the present investigation into the cyclicality of monetary and fiscal 
policy in South Africa. The goal was to identify the relevant policy shocks using a model-based technique and 
then to judge the cyclicality of the policies so identified. A final goal was to estimate an order of magnitude of the 
contribution made by macroeconomic policy to the stabilisation of the South African economy.  
 
Though there is substantial South African literature on the cyclicality of monetary and fiscal policies, there is little 
agreement over the results. This paper builds on the literature by considering a model that avoids some of the 
previous shortcomings, especially the failure to incorporate dynamic and multi-variable effects. Despite this, the 
results remain somewhat ambiguous: the proxy for the fiscal policy shock shows evidence of pro-cyclicality in the 
period since 1994, but closer scrutiny of the evidence suggests that the observed pro-cyclicality is all due to the  
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period since 2002. This caveat does not cancel the evidence of emerging pro-cyclical fiscal policy, but it does 
suggest caution in interpreting a correlation based on the impact of a policy for what has become a highly 
exceptional business cycle phase for the South African economy. Further, the model proposed here does not 
predict that the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy (such as it was) has had a quantitatively large destabilising impact on 
real output since 1994. 
 
A similar message emerges for monetary policy. Again, there is evidence of pro-cyclicality since 1994, but it is 
driven by an even more recent period, the end of sample period 2004 to 2006. Earlier sub-samples show evidence 
of counter-cyclical monetary policy, and the counterfactual analysis suggests that monetary policy has either had 










Table 1    Estimated output elasticities for components of government revenue 
Revenue component  Elasticity estimate 
Du Plessis and Boshoff (2007) 
Total  income  tax  on  persons,  individuals, 
corporations and other enterprises 
1.05 
Total taxes on income, profits and capital gains  0.82 
Total taxes on payroll and workforce  1.19 
Transfer duties  1.27 
Total other taxes on property   1.37 
Total taxes on property  1.35 
Value-added tax (total)  1.14 
Value-added tax (domestic)  1.06 
Value-added tax (customs)  1.40 
Fuel levy  0.67 
Other excise duties  0.85 
Total domestic taxes on goods and services  1.02 
Total taxes on international trade and transactions  0.36 
Other taxes  1.05 
Total tax revenue  1.06 
Swanepoel and Schoeman (2003) 
Direct taxes  0.42 
Indirect taxesa  0.19 
Total revenue and grants  0.91 
OECD average 
Corporate tax  1.5 
Personal tax  1.26 
Source: Du Plessis and Boshoff (2007), Swanepoel and Schoeman (2003), and (Girouard and André, 2005)). 
a “Consisting of taxes on net income and profits, donations tax, estate duty and taxes on payroll and workforce” (Swanepoel 




Table 2    Data 
Variable  Calculation  Source 
∆yt  First difference of the log of real GDP  SARB, RB6006D 
gt  Ratio of government consumption to GDP 
(does not include interest payments) 
SARB, RB6008D, 
RB6006D 
rt  Real interest rate calculated, using monthly 
data and a within-quarter formula16  
SARB, Discount rate and 
CPI index, RB 7032N 
 
                                                       
16 For each quarter the real interest rate was calculated using monthly data and the following formula where mt means the 
quarter’s middle month: 
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Table 3    Correlations between accumulated demand shocks and the accumulated supply shock 
Correlation 
Longer sample  Shorter sample 
Period 
Fiscal shock vs 
Supply shock 
Monetary shock vs 
Supply shock 
Fiscal shock vs 
Supply shock 
Monetary shock vs 
Supply shock 
1984Q4-2006Q4  0.0333  0.2099  0.3524  0.5780 
1984Q4-1994Q1  -0.5116  0.2697  -0.7422  0.7996 
1994Q1-2006Q4  0.0738  -0.3034  0.7094  -0.2218 
1994Q1-2002Q1  -0.8978  -0.4553  -0.5871  0.3861 
2002Q1-2006Q4  0.8715  0.3605  0.9840  -0.4927 
2002Q1-2004Q4  0.3860  -0.0706  0.9899  -0.8725 





Table 4    Variability of real output under different policy scenarios 
 
Standard deviation 





Shorter sample model       
1984q4-2006q3  0.69%  0.68%  0.66% 
1994q1-2006q3  0.45%  0.44%  0.38% 
       
Longer sample model       
1961q2-2006q3  1.12%  1.13%  1.11% 
1994q1-2006q3  0.49%  0.56%  0.42% 
 
 
Figure 1   The ‘great moderation’ of the South African economy 
Source: Own calculation from SARB quarterly bulletin data  
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Figure 2    The stability of the South African economy in an international context (1996-2006) 
Source: Data from the IFS data base 
 
   
 
Figure 3   Observed and structural budget balances for South Africa  
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Figure 5   The fiscal stance and the output gap (1992Q2 to 2006Q3) 
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Figure 6   Impulse response of the government consumption to aggregate supply and monetary policy shocks 
Longer sample (1960+)   Shorter sample (1983+) 
 
   
 
 
Figure 7   Impulse response of real GDP to a contractionary monetary policy shock 
Longer sample (1960+)  Shorter sample (1983+) 
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Figure 8   Impulse response of the real interest rate to aggregate supply and fiscal policy shocks 
Longer sample (1960+)  Shorter sample (1983+) 
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